Few decisions expose the tension in healthcare leadership more clearly than deciding whether to close a clinical program.
The financial analysis may be straightforward. The decision rarely is.
Hospitals operate with finite resources and enormous fixed costs. When a clinical program consistently loses $1 million or $2 million a year, leadership can't simply acknowledge that it serves an important purpose and move on. That loss has to be absorbed somewhere. It competes with nursing positions, equipment, facility needs, physician recruitment, new programs, and every other priority the organization is trying to fund.
Continuing the program is a decision. Closing it is a decision. Neither is financially or operationally neutral.
I've confronted that choice from very different sides.
At one hospital, we operated a geriatric psychiatric program that was losing significant money. We worked on the program, but eventually reached the point where continuing to absorb the losses was no longer something we believed the hospital could justify. We closed it, improving annual financial performance by approximately $1.2 million.
That was a significant operating improvement, but the health system didn't necessarily view it as a success. There was disappointment that we had not found a way to operate the program successfully ourselves.
I encountered a different version of the dilemma with a burn center.
The program required an annual subsidy of approximately $1.5 million. That level of recurring support was difficult to ignore, and there was significant system pressure to eliminate it. Ultimately, the burn center closed.
The savings were real. So were the consequences.
The hospital lost an important clinical capability and some of the broader value that came with operating it. A burn center signals a level of clinical capability that extends beyond the patients treated in the program itself. It also creates important relationships with first responders who trust the hospital with some of their most difficult patients. Those relationships don't appear neatly on a service-line income statement.
Closing the burn center eliminated a $1.5 million annual subsidy. But $1.5 million didn't represent the full value of what went away.
That's what makes these decisions difficult.
A service-line P&L matters, but it can't answer the question by itself.
Leaders first need to understand why a program is underperforming. The economics may be structural, or there may be operating issues that can be addressed. Demand, reimbursement, staffing, physician coverage, referral patterns, cost structure, and the investment required to improve the program all matter.
Clinical viability matters too. The organization needs sufficient volume, expertise, staffing, and infrastructure to provide the service at the quality patients deserve. Sometimes preserving access may require a different approach than preserving the existing program.
Then there is the question of what disappears if the program closes.
Where will patients go? Can another provider meet the need? What does the program contribute to other clinical services? Does it strengthen relationships with physicians, first responders, or the broader community? Does it influence how patients perceive the clinical capabilities of the hospital?
Some of that value can be measured. Some of it can't.
Mission also can't mean that every clinical program receives an indefinite subsidy. Resources committed to one service aren't available somewhere else. Capital, clinical talent, beds, and leadership attention are finite. Continuing to subsidize one program may mean not expanding another service where the organization could serve more patients or produce better outcomes.
Sometimes the choice isn't limited to keeping a program or closing it. The underlying community need might be met through partnership, consolidation, regionalization, referral relationships, or a different model of care.
That's what ultimately happened with both of these programs.
The geriatric psychiatric closure eliminated approximately $1.2 million in annual losses. Through an affiliation agreement, the community continued to have access to the service without the hospital continuing to absorb those losses.
The burn-center closure eliminated approximately $1.5 million in annual subsidy, but the tradeoff was different. Another provider ultimately picked up the service, preserving access to burn care in the community, while our hospital gave up the clinical capability and the reputation, first-responder relationships, and broader community value that came with providing it.
Both decisions improved financial performance, and in both cases the underlying clinical need continued to be served.
Healthcare leaders are often asked to make decisions in which preserving one important thing requires giving up another.
The responsibility is to understand what is being gained, what is being lost, what alternatives actually exist, and what the organization and the community it serves can least afford to give up.
